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Introduction 
Over the past twenty years the world’s major central banks have 
been largely successful at bringing inflation under control.  While it 
is premature to suggest that inflation is no longer an issue of great 
concern, it is quite conceivable that the next battles facing central 
bankers will lie on a different front.  One development that has already 
concentrated the minds of policy-makers is an apparent increase in 
financial instability, of which one important dimension is increased 
volatility of asset prices.  Borio, Kennedy, and Prowse (1994), among 
others, document the emergence of major boom-bust cycles in the prices 
of equity and real estate in a number of industrialized countries during 
the 1980s.  Notable examples include the United States, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Finland.   
Associated with the “bust” part of the asset price cycle in many 
of these cases were significant contractions in real economic activity.  
For example, many economists attribute at least some part of the 1990 
recession (and the slow recovery) in the United States to the preceding 
decline in commercial real estate prices, which weakened the capital 
positions of banks and the balance sheets of corporate borrowers 
(Bernanke and Lown, 1991).  More recently, of course, we have seen asset 
price crashes in East Asia and Latin America, along with continued 
stagnation of stock and land prices in Japan, all of which have been 
associated with poor economic performance.  With these experiences in   3
mind, some observers have viewed the remarkable rise of the past few 
years in U.S. stock prices, and to a lesser extent in real estate 
prices, as an ominous development.  Of course, as of this writing, 
whether the U.S. stock market boom will be sustained or will end in 
tears is anybody’s guess. 
In this paper we address the question of how central bankers ought 
to respond to asset price volatility, in the context of an overall 
strategy for monetary policy.  To be clear, we agree that monetary 
policy is not by itself a sufficient tool to contain the potentially 
damaging effects of booms and busts in asset prices.  Well-designed and 
transparent legal and accounting systems, a sound regulatory structure 
that helps to limit the risk exposure of banks and corporations, and 
prudent fiscal policies that help instill public confidence in economic 
fundamentals, are all vital components of an overall strategy to 
insulate the economy from financial disturbances.  However, our reading 
of history is that asset price crashes have done sustained damage to the 
economy only in cases when monetary policy remained unresponsive or 
actively reinforced deflationary pressures.  This observation is our 
justification for focusing on monetary policy here. 
The principal argument of the paper is easily stated.  Our view is 
that, in the context of short-term monetary policy management, central 
banks should view price stability and financial stability as highly 
complementary and mutually consistent objectives, to be pursued within a 
unified policy framework.  In particular, we believe that the best 
policy framework for attaining both objectives is a regime of flexible 
inflation targeting, either of the implicit form now practiced in the 
United States or of the more explicit and transparent type that has been   4
adopted in many other countries.  (We prefer the latter, for reasons 
explained briefly at the conclusion of the paper.) 
The inflation-targeting approach dictates that central banks 
should adjust monetary policy actively and preemptively to offset 
incipient inflationary or deflationary pressures.  Importantly for 
present purposes, it also implies that policy should not respond to 
changes in asset prices, except insofar as they signal changes in 
expected inflation.  Trying to stabilize asset prices per se is 
problematic for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that it 
is nearly impossible to know for sure whether a given change in asset 
values results from fundamental factors, non-fundamental factors, or 
both.  By focusing on the inflationary or deflationary pressures 
generated by asset price movements, a central bank effectively responds 
to the toxic side effects of asset booms and busts without getting into 
the business of deciding what is a fundamental and what is not.  It also 
avoids the historically relevant risk that a bubble, once “pricked”, can 
easily degenerate into a panic.  Finally, because inflation targeting 
both helps to provide stable macroeconomic conditions and also implies 
that interest rates will tend to rise during (inflationary) asset price 
booms and fall during (deflationary) asset price busts, this approach 
may reduce the potential for financial panics to arise in the first 
place. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  We begin in 
section I with an informal summary of our views on how asset prices 
interact with the real economy and of the associated implications for 
monetary policy.  To address these issues more formally, sections II and 
III present some illustrative policy simulations derived from a small-  5
scale macroeconomic model that features an explicit role for financial 
conditions in determining real activity.  We move from theory to 
practice in section IV, in which we briefly examine the recent 
performance of monetary policy in the United States and Japan, both of 
which have experienced asset price volatility.  Section V concludes with 
some discussion of additional issues.  An appendix provides more details 
of the simulation model employed in sections II and III. 
 
Section I.   Asset Prices, the Economy, and Monetary Policy: An Overview 
Asset prices, including in particular the prices of equities and 
real estate, are remarkably variable; and, although we must not lose 
sight of the fact that ultimately asset prices are endogenous variables, 
there are periods when asset values seem all but disconnected from the 
current state of the economy.  As we noted in the introduction, over the 
past two decades economies across the globe have experienced large boom-
and-bust cycles in the prices of various assets, including equities, 
commercial real estate, residential housing, and others. 
Should fluctuations in asset prices be of concern to policy-
makers?  In the economist’s usual benchmark case, a world of efficient 
capital markets and without regulatory distortions, movements in asset 
prices simply reflect changes in underlying economic fundamentals.  
Under these circumstances, central bankers would have no reason to 
concern themselves with asset price volatility per se.  Asset prices 
would be of interest only to the extent that they provide useful 
information about the state of the economy. 
Matters change, however if two conditions are met.  The first is 
that “non-fundamental” factors sometime underlie asset market   6
volatility.  The second is that changes in asset prices unrelated to 
fundamental factors have potentially significant impacts on the rest of 
the economy.  If these two conditions are satisfied, then asset price 
volatility becomes to some degree an independent source of economic 
instability, of which policy-makers should take account. 
That both of these conditions hold seems plausible to us, though 
there is room for disagreement on either count.  We briefly discuss each 
in turn. 
As potential sources of “non-fundamental” fluctuations in asset 
prices, at least two possibilities have been suggested: poor regulatory 
practice and imperfect rationality on the part of investors (“market 
psychology”).  Regarding the former, Borio et al. (1994) present 
evidence for the view that financial reforms which dramatically 
increased access to credit by firms and households contributed to asset-
price booms in the 1980s in Scandinavia, Japan, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and elsewhere.  Financial liberalizations in developing 
countries that have opened the gates for capital inflows from abroad 
have also been associated in some cases with sharply rising asset 
values, along with booms in consumption and lending.   
But aren’t liberalizations a good thing?  It depends.  As Allen 
and Gale (1998) and others have emphasized, problems arise when 
financial liberalizations are not well coordinated with the regulatory 
safety net (e.g., deposit insurance and lender-of-last resort 
commitments).  If liberalization gives additional powers to private 
lenders and borrowers while retaining government guarantees of 
liabilities, excessive risk-taking and speculation will follow, leading 
in many cases to asset-price booms.  Ultimately, however, unsound   7
financial conditions are exposed and lending and asset prices collapse.  
This scenario seems to characterize reasonably well the banking crises 
recently experienced in a number of countries, including the United 
States and Japan, as well as some of the recent crises in East Asia and 
Latin America.  
The other possible source of non-fundamental movements in asset 
prices which has received much attention is irrational behavior by 
investors, e.g., herd behavior, excessive optimism, or short-termism.  
There is of course a large literature in finance on bubbles, fads, and 
the like.  This literature has gained a measure of credence because of 
the great difficulty of explaining the observed level of financial 
volatility by models based solely on economic fundamentals (see for 
example the recent survey by Campbell, forthcoming).  Advocates of 
bubbles would probably be forced to admit that it is difficult or 
impossible to identify any particular episode conclusively as a bubble, 
even after the fact.
1  Nevertheless, episodes of “irrational exuberance” 
in financial markets are certainly a logical possibility, and one about 
which at least some central bankers are evidently concerned.  With this 
concern as motivation, we present simulations of the economic effects of 
bubbles and of alternative policy responses to bubbles in section III. 
The second necessary condition for asset-price volatility to be of 
concern to policy-makers is that booms and busts in asset markets have 
                         
1 As we show in the context of our simulation model below, even when a 
bubble is present, the market price can still be expressed as a 
discounted stream of cash flows, though with a discount rate that 
differs from the fundamental rate. In particular, periods in which the 
market price is above the fundamental are also periods in which the 
implied discount rate is below the true fundamental rate, and vice 
versa.  Because the “fundamental discount rate” is not directly 
observable, it is in general impossible to know whether there is a non-
fundamental component to the current stock price.   8
important effects on the real economy.  Although the two-way causality 
between the economy and asset prices makes it difficult to obtain sharp 
estimates of the real effects of changes in asset prices, the historical 
experience – from the Great Depression of the 1930s to the most recent 
epidemic of crises — is supportive of the view that large asset-price 
fluctuations can have important effects on the economy. 
What are the mechanisms?  One much-cited possibility is that 
changes in asset prices affect consumption spending via their effects on 
household wealth.  We are not inclined to place a heavy weight on this 
channel, however.  Empirical studies (e.g., Ludvigson and Steindel, 
1999; Parker, forthcoming) have not found a strong or reliable 
connection between stock market wealth and consumption for example.  
This result is perhaps not too surprising, as much of the stock owned by 
households is held in pension accounts, implying that changes in stock 
values have relatively little direct impact on spendable cash.   
Our own view is that the quantitatively most important connections 
between asset prices and the real economy operate through aspects of 
what in earlier work we have called the “balance sheet channel”.
2  The 
world in which we live, as opposed to the one envisioned by the 
benchmark neoclassical model, is one in which credit markets are not 
frictionless, i.e., problems of information, incentives, and enforcement 
are pervasive.  Because of these problems, credit can be extended more 
freely and at lower cost to borrowers who already have strong financial 
positions (hence Ambrose Bierce’s definition of a banker as someone who 
                         
2 To be clear, for the analysis that follows it is only necessary that 
non-fundamental movements in asset prices affect aggregate demand.  In 
other work we have found that, to explain the observed volatility of 
output, it is necessary to have a balance-sheet channel supplementing 
the traditional wealth effect.   9
lends you an umbrella when the sun is shining and wants it back when it 
starts to rain).   
A key implication of the existence of credit-market frictions is 
that cash flows and the condition of balance sheets are important 
determinants of agents’ ability to borrow and lend.  Research suggests 
that the effects of asset price changes on the economy are transmitted 
to a very significant extent through their effects on the balance sheets 
of households, firms, and financial intermediaries (see for example 
Bernanke, Gertler, Gilchrist, forthcoming; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).  
For example, firms or households may use assets they hold as collateral 
when borrowing, in order to ameliorate information and incentive 
problems that would otherwise interfere with credit extension.  Under 
such circumstances, a decline in asset values (for example, a fall in 
home equity values) reduces available collateral, leads to an unplanned 
increase in leverage on the part of borrowers, and impedes potential 
borrowers’ access to credit.  Financial intermediaries, which must 
maintain an adequate ratio of capital to assets, can be deterred from 
lending, or induced to shift the composition of loans away from bank-
dependent sectors such as small business, by declines in the values of 
the assets they hold.   
Deteriorating balance sheets and reduced credit flows operate 
primarily on spending and aggregate demand in the short run, although in 
the longer run they may also affect aggregate supply by inhibiting 
capital formation and reducing working capital.  There are also likely 
to be significant feedback and magnification effects:  First, declining 
sales and employment imply continuing weakening of cash flows and hence 
further declines in spending.  Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996)   10
refer to this magnification effect as the “financial accelerator” (see 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, for an early formalization).  Second, there 
may also be feedback to asset prices, as declining spending and income, 
together with forced asset sales, lead to further decreases in asset 
values.  This “debt-deflation” mechanism, first described by Irving 
Fisher (1933), has been modeled formally by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 
(forthcoming). 
A large literature has studied the macroeconomic implications of 
credit-market frictions, both theoretically and empirically.
3  We have 
reviewed that body of research on several occasions and will not attempt 
to do so here.  We note, however, that in general this perspective has 
proved quite useful for interpreting a number of historical episodes, 
including the Great Depression (Bernanke, 1983; Bernanke and James, 
1991), the deep Scandinavian recession of the 1980s, the “credit crunch” 
episode of 1990-91 in the United States (Bernanke and Lown, 1991), and 
the protracted weakness of the Japanese economy in the 1990s.  A number 
of observers (Mishkin, 1997; Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee, 1999; 
Krumgan, 1999) have also used this framework to make sense of the fact 
that, contrary to conventional wisdom, exchange-rate devaluations have 
appeared to be contractionary in a number of the developing countries 
that experienced financial crises in recent years.  The explanation is 
tied to the fact that — beguiled by sometimes large interest 
differentials between loans made in foreign and domestic currencies — 
banks and corporations in these countries made liberal use of unhedged, 
                         
3 For relevant surveys see Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Hubbard (1997), 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(forthcoming).   11
foreign-currency-denominated debt.  The large devaluations that 
subsequently occurred raised the domestic-currency value of these debts, 
wreaking havoc with bank and corporate balance sheets and inducing 
financial distress and major dislocations in credit, employment, and 
supplier relationships. 
Beyond providing a mechanism via which non-fundamental movements 
in asset prices may disrupt the economy, a key implication of the 
credit-market-frictions perspective is that the magnitude of the effects 
of asset-price fluctuations on the economy will depend strongly on 
initial financial conditions.  By the term we mean primarily the initial 
state of household, firm, and intermediary balance sheets.
4  In 
particular, the theory predicts a highly nonlinear effect of asset 
prices on spending (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989).  Thus, if balance 
sheets are initially strong, with low leverage and strong cash flows, 
then even rather large declines in asset prices are unlikely to push 
households and firms into the region of financial distress, in which 
normal access to credit is jeopardized, or to lead to severe capital 
problems for banks.  Put another way, the extent to which an asset-price 
contraction weakens private sector balance sheets depends on the degree 
and sectoral distribution of initial risk exposure.  
The current (1999) U.S. economy is, we conjecture, a case in 
point.  After many years of expansion, strong profits in both the 
                         
4 We implicitly include in this definition any institutional and 
regulatory structure that may affect private sector risk exposure. For 
example, both U.S. and Japanese banks hold real estate (or make loans 
with real estate as collateral), but by law only Japanese banks are 
allowed to hold equities. This apparently incidental difference has 
strong implications for the likely effects of a stock-price collapse on 
bank capital and bank lending in the two countries, as indeed we have 
seen in Japan in the past few years.   12
corporate and banking sectors, and enormous increases in the values of 
equities and other assets, U.S. balance sheets are in excellent 
condition.  A correction in the stock market of, say, 25% would no doubt 
slow the economy, but our guess is that the effects would be relatively 
transitory, particularly if monetary policy responds appropriately.  In 
contrast, a 25% decline in Japanese stock prices, given the parlous 
condition of its financial system and its seeming inability to implement 
a coherent stabilization policy, would (we expect) create grave and 
long-lasting problems for that economy. 
If we believe that asset price swings can occur for non-
fundamental reasons, and that these swings – either through balance-
sheet effects or some other channel – have the potential to destabilize 
the real economy, then what are the implications for monetary policy?  
As suggested in the introduction, our view is that central banks can and 
should treat price stability and financial stability as consistent and 
mutually reinforcing objectives.  In practice, we believe, this is best 
accomplished by adopting a strategy of flexible inflation targeting.
5 
What is flexible inflation targeting?  Although specific practices 
differ, broadly speaking a regime of inflation targeting has three 
characteristics.  First, as the name suggests, under inflation targeting 
monetary policy is committed to achieving a specific level of inflation 
in the long run, and long-run price stability is designated the 
“overriding” or “primary” long-run goal of policy.  Importantly, 
                         
5 Inflation targeting has been adopted in recent years by a substantial 
number of industrialized and developing countries, including (among many 
others) the United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, New Zealand, Chile, and most 
recently Brazil.  An extensive literature has developed on the early 
experience with this approach; see for example Goodhart and Viñals 
(1994), Haldane (1995), Leiderman and Svensson (1995), Bernanke and 
Mishkin (1997), and Bernanke et al. (1999) for comparative analyses.   13
inflation targeters are concerned that inflation not be too low as well 
as that it not be too high; avoidance of deflation is as important (or 
perhaps even more important) as avoidance of high inflation.  Second, 
within the constraints imposed by the long-run inflation objective, the 
central bank has some flexibility in the short run to pursue other 
objectives, including output stabilization – hence the nomenclature 
“flexible inflation targeting”.
6  Third, inflation targeting is 
generally characterized by substantial openness and transparency on the 
part of monetary policymakers, including for example the issuance of 
regular reports on the inflation situation and open public discussion of 
policy options and plans. 
Our characterization of Federal Reserve policy in recent years is 
that it meets the first two parts of the definition of inflation 
targeting (see section IV for econometric support of this view) but not 
the third, i.e., the Fed practices “implicit” rather than “explicit” 
inflation targeting.  Bernanke et al. (1999) argue that the Fed ought to 
                         
6 Inflation targeting has been castigated in some quarters as a policy 
of “inflation nutters”, to use Mervyn King’s descriptive phrase.  This 
criticism is simply incorrect, however.  As Lars Svensson (1997, 1999) 
has shown, inflation targeting is completely consistent with a 
conventional quadratic central-bank loss function that places arbitrary 
weights on the output gap and inflation; in other words, inflation 
targeting in no way precludes significant attention to conventional 
stabilization objectives. 
So what then is new? One important advantage is that an inflation-
targeting framework makes explicit (for both policymakers and the 
public) the simple fact that monetary-policy actions that expand output 
and employment, but which also leave the inflation rate higher than it 
was initially, do not necessarily increase social welfare on net.  
Instead, account must also be taken of the future losses in output and 
employment that will be necessary to bring inflation back to its initial 
level; or, alternatively, of the various distortions and reductions in 
long-term economic growth associated with a permanent increase in 
inflation.  By enforcing the requirement that any sequence of policy 
actions be consistent with the long-run inflation target (a sort of 
nominal anchor requirement), the inflation-targeting framework 
eliminates the upward inflation ratchet that proved so costly in many   14
take the next step and adopt explicit inflation targeting.  For most of 
the present paper, however, we make no distinction between implicit and 
explicit inflation targeting; we return to the issue briefly in the 
conclusion. 
For our purposes here, the main advantage of flexible inflation 
targeting is that it provides a unified framework both for making 
monetary policy in normal times, and for preventing and ameliorating the 
effects of financial crises.  In particular, a key advantage of the 
inflation-targeting framework is that it induces policymakers to 
automatically adjust interest rates in a stabilizing direction in the 
face of asset-price instability or other financial disturbances.  The 
logic is straightforward; since asset price increases stimulate 
aggregate demand and asset price declines reduce it, the strong focus of 
inflation targeters on stabilizing aggregate demand will result in 
“leaning against the wind”---raising interest rates as asset prices rise 
and reducing them when they fall.  This automatic response not only 
stabilizes the economy but is likely to be stabilizing for financial 
markets themselves, for several reasons:  First, macroeconomic 
stability, particularly the absence of inflation or deflation, is itself 
calming to financial markets.
7  Second, the central bank’s easing in the 
face of asset price declines should help to insulate balance sheets to 
some degree, reducing the economy’s vulnerability to further adverse 
shocks.  And finally, if financial-market participants expect the 
central bank to behave in this countercyclical manner, raising interest 
                                                                         
countries in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s. 
7 Note that even theories that stress the self-fulfilling nature of 
crisis expectations (e.g. Obstfeld, 1994), usually imply that such 
expectations can only arise if fundamentals are relatively weak.   15
rates when asset price increases threaten to overheat the economy and 
vice versa, it is possible that overreactions in asset prices arising 
from market psychology and other non-fundamental forces might be 
moderated. 
The logic of inflation targeting also implies that central banks 
should ignore movements in stock prices that do not appear to be 
generating inflationary or deflationary pressures.  We concede that 
forecasting the aggregate demand effects of asset-price movements may 
not always be an easy task.  However it is certainly easier than, first, 
attempting to distinguish between fundamental and non-fundamental 
fluctuations in asset prices and, second, attempting to surgically 
“prick” the bubble without doing collateral damage to financial markets 
or the economy.  We explore the implications of alternative policy 
responses to asset-price fluctuations in greater detail in the next two 
sections. 
 
Section II.  Monetary Policy in the Presence of Asset Price Bubbles: A 
Quantitative Model 
 
To make the discussion of section I more concrete, we will present 
some model-based simulations of the performance of alternative monetary 
rules in the presence of bubbles in asset prices.  To do this, we extend 
a small-scale macroeconomic model developed by Bernanke, Gertler, and 
Gilchrist (forthcoming), henceforth BGG.  For the most part, the BGG 
model is a standard dynamic new Keynesian model, modified to allow for 
financial accelerator effects, as described in the previous section.  
Our principal extension of the BGG model here is to allow for exogenous 
bubbles in asset prices.    16
In this section we first provide an informal overview of the BGG 
model and then describe how we modify the model to allow for bubbles in 
asset prices.  The equations of the complete model are given in the 
Appendix.
8  Readers not interested in any of this background material 
may wish to skip directly to the simulation results in section III. 
 
The BGG Model 
As noted, the foundation of the BGG model is a standard dynamic 
new Keynesian framework.  The most important sectors are a household 
sector and a business sector.  Households are infinitely lived; they 
work, consume, and save.  Business firms are owned by entrepreneurs who 
have finite expected life.
9  There is also a government that manages 
fiscal and monetary policy. 
Firms own the stock of physical capital, financing the acquisition 
of capital through internally generated funds (primarily revenues from 
production and capital gains on assets) and by borrowing from the 
public.  With their accumulated capital plus hired labor, firms produce 
output, which may be used for consumption, investment, or government 
purchases.  There is no foreign sector.  
Following Taylor (1980), Calvo (1983), and others, BGG assume the 
existence of staggered nominal price setting.  The resulting 
“stickiness” in prices allows monetary policy to have real effects on 
the economy.  Optimization and forward-looking behavior are assumed 
                         
8 Interested readers are referred to Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 
(forthcoming) for additional detail. 
9 Finite lives are a metaphor for the entry and exit of firms and the 
associated turnover in credit markets.  The assumption of finite lives 
also prevents the business sector from ever reaching a steady state in 
which it is entirely self-financing.   17
throughout; the single exception is the Phillips curve relationship, in 
which inflation expectations are modeled as being formed by a 
combination of forward- and backward-looking behavior.
10  This 
modification increases the persistence of the inflation process, 
allowing a closer fit to the data. 
The BGG model differs from this standard dynamic new Keynesian 
framework primarily in assuming the existence of credit-market 
frictions, i.e., problems of information, incentives, and enforcement in 
credit relationships.  The presence of these frictions gives rise to a 
“financial accelerator” that affects output dynamics.  In particular, in 
the BGG model credit-market frictions make uncollateralized external 
finance more expensive than internal finance; this premium for external 
finance affects the overall cost of capital and thus the real investment 
decisions of firms.  The external finance premium depends inversely on 
the financial condition of potential borrowers; for example, a borrowing 
firm with more internal equity can offer more collateral to lenders.  
Thus, procyclical movements in the financial condition of potential 
borrowers translate into countercyclical movements in the premium for 
external finance, which in turn magnify investment and output 
fluctuations in the BGG model (the financial accelerator).   
Consider, for example, a shock to the economy that improves 
fundamentals, such as a technological breakthrough.  This shock will 
have direct effects on output, employment, and the like.  In the BGG 
model, however, there are also indirect effects of the shock, arising 
                         
10 Specifically, we use a variant of Calvo’s (1983) staggered price 
setting model developed by Gali and Gertler (forthcoming) that allows a 
subset of firms to use rule-of-thumb pricing behavior.  The resulting 
aggregate supply equation is similar in spirit to the “sticky inflation” 
model of Fuhrer and Moore (1995).   18
from the associated increase in asset prices.  Higher asset prices 
improve balance sheets, reducing the external finance premium and 
further stimulating investment spending.  The increase in investment may 
also lead to further increases in asset prices and cash flows, inducing 
additional feedback effects on spending.  Thus the financial accelerator 
enhances the effects of primitive shocks to the economy. 
The financial accelerator mechanism also has potentially important 
implications for the workings of monetary policy.  As in conventional 
frameworks, the existence of nominal rigidities gives the central bank 
in the BGG model some control over the short-term real interest rate.  
However, beyond the usual neoclassical channels through which the real 
interest rate affects spending, in the BGG model there is an additional 
effect that arises from the impact of interest rates on borrower balance 
sheets.  For example, a reduction in the real interest rate (a policy 
easing) raises asset prices, improving the financial condition of 
borrowers and reducing the external finance premium.  The reduction in 
the premium provides additional stimulus for investment.  BGG find the 
extra “kick” provided by this mechanism to be important for explaining 
the quantitative effects of monetary policy.  Note also that, to the 
extent that financial crises are associated with deteriorating private-
sector balance sheets, the BGG framework implies that monetary policy 
has a direct means of calming such crises.  
The BGG model assumes that only fundamentals drive asset prices, 
so that the financial accelerator serves to amplify only fundamental 
shocks, such as shocks to productivity or spending.  Our extension of 
the BGG framework in this paper allows for the possibility that non-  19
fundamental factors affect asset prices, which in turn affect the real 
economy via the financial accelerator. 
 
Adding Exogenous Asset Price Bubbles 
The fundamental value of capital is the present value of the 
dividends the capital is expected to generate.  Formally, define the 
fundamental value of depreciable capital in period t,  t Q , as: 
 
(2.1)  
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where  t E  indicates the expectation as of period t, d  is the physical 
depreciation rate of capital,  i t D +  
are dividends, and 
q
t R 1 +  is the 
relevant stochastic gross discount rate at t for dividends received in 
period t+1. 
As noted, our principal modification of the BGG model is to allow 
for the possibility that observed equity prices differ persistently from 
fundamental values, e.g., because of “bubbles” or “fads”.
11  We use the 
term “bubble” here loosely to denote temporary deviations of asset 
prices from fundamental values, due for example to liquidity trading or 
to waves of optimism or pessimism.
12   
                         
11 We also make some smaller changes that are important for the 
simulations we want to do, such as calibrating a realistic effect of 
changes in asset prices on consumption. 
12 We do not attempt to rationalize why investors do not arbitrage the 
difference between the market and fundamental returns.  To our 
knowledge, any theory of bubbles based on market psychology relies on 
some arbitrary assumption along these lines.  This point also applies to   20
The key new assumption is that the market price of capital,  t S , 
may differ from capital’s fundamental value,  t Q .  A bubble exists 
whenever  0 „ - t t Q S .  We assume that if a bubble exists at date t it 
persists with probability  p  and grows as follows
13: 
 
(2.2)   
q
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with  1 < < a p .  If the bubble crashes, with probability  p - 1 , then 
 
(2.3)    0 1 1 = - + + t t Q S  
 
Note that, since  1 > p a , the bubble will grow until such time as it 
bursts.  For simplicity, we assume that if a bubble crashes it is not 
expected to re-emerge.  These assumptions imply that the expected part 
of the bubble follows the process 
 












+ +  
                                                                         
the so-called rational bubbles of Blanchard and Watson (1982).  We do 
not use Blanchard-Watson rational bubbles in this paper because their 
non-stationarity creates technical problems in our framework. 
13 By treating the probability that the bubble bursts as exogenous, we 
rule out the possibility that monetary policy can surgically prick the 
bubble.  Although it is certainly possible to endogenize this 
probability, so little is known about the effects of policy actions on 
market psychology that any modification along these lines would 
necessarily be ad hoc.  Note that it is nevertheless the case in our 
framework that asset prices will be highly sensitive to monetary policy, 
since policy can affect the fundamental component.  Thus the empirical 
observation that asset prices react strongly to monetary policy actions   21
 
Since the parameter a is restricted to be less than unity, the 
discounted value of the bubble converges to zero over time, with the 
rate governed by the value of a.
14  That is, bubbles are not expected to 
last forever.  
Using (2.1) and (2.4) we can derive an expression for the 
evolution of the stock price, inclusive of the bubble: 
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where the return on stocks, 
s
t R 1 + , is related to the fundamental return 
on capital, 
q
t R 1 + , by 
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and  ) 1 ( d - ” a b .   
Equation (2.6) shows that, in the presence of bubbles, the 
expected return on stocks will differ from the return implied by 
fundamentals.  If there is a positive bubble,  1 > t t Q S , the expected 
return on stocks will be below the fundamental return, and vice versa if 
there is a negative bubble,  1 < t t Q S .  However, if the bubble persists 
                                                                         
is not direct evidence against the exogeneity assumption made here. 
14 Note that  1 = a  corresponds to the so-called rational bubble described 
in Blanchard and Watson (1982). Hence our bubble specification can be 
made arbitrarily close to a rational bubble by the assumption that a is 
close to one.   22
(does not “pop”) a series of supranormal returns will be observed.  This 
process seems to us to provide a reasonable description of speculative 
swings in the stock market. 
The bubble affects real activity in the extended model in two 
ways.  First, there is a wealth effect on consumption.  Following 
estimates of the wealth effect presented in Ludvigson and Steindel 
(1999), we parameterize the model so that these effects are relatively 
modest (about four cents of consumption spending for each extra dollar 
of stock market wealth). Second, since the quality of firms’ balance 
sheets depends on the market values of their assets rather than the 
fundamental values, a bubble in asset prices affects firms’ financial 
positions and thus the premium for external finance.  
Although bubbles in the stock market affect balance sheets and 
thus the cost of capital, we continue to assume that - conditional on 
the cost of capital - firms make investments based on fundamental 
considerations, such as net present value, rather than on valuations of 
capital including the bubble.  This assumption rules out the arbitrage 
of building new capital and selling it at the market price cum bubble 
(or, equivalently, issuing new shares to finance new capital).  This 
assumption is theoretically justifiable, for example by the lemons 
premium associated with new equity issues, and also seems empirically  
realistic; see, e.g., Bond and Cummins (1999).  
  In summary, the main change effected by our extension of the BGG 
framework is to allow non-fundamental movements in asset prices to 
influence real activity.  Though the source of the shock may differ, 
however, the main link between changes in asset prices and the real 
economy remains the financial accelerator, as in the BGG model.   23
 
Section III.  The Impact of Asset-Price Fluctuations Under Alternative 
Monetary Policy Rules 
 
  In this section we use the extended BGG model to simulate the 
effects of asset-price bubbles and related shocks, such as innovations 
to the risk spread, on the economy.  Our goal is to explore what types 
of policy rules are best at moderating the disruptive effects of asset-
market disturbances.  To foreshadow the results, we find that a policy 
rule that is actively focused on stabilizing inflation seems to work 
well, and that this result is reasonably robust across different 
scenarios.   
As a baseline, we assume that the central bank follows a simple 
forward-looking policy rule of the form 
 
(3.1)  1 + + = t t
n n




t r  is the nominal instrument interest rate controlled by the 
central bank, 
n r  is the steady-state value of the nominal interest 
rate, and  1 + t t E p  is the rate of inflation expected in the next model 
“period”.  We will always assume  1 > b , so that the central bank 
responds to a one percentage point increase in expected inflation by 
raising the nominal interest rate by more than one percentage point.  
This ensures that the real interest rate increases in the face of rising 
expected inflation, so that policy is stabilizing.   24
  The policy rule given by equation (3.1) differs from the 
conventional Taylor rule in at least two ways.
15  First, policy is 
assumed to respond to anticipations of inflation rather than past values 
of inflation.  Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998, forthcoming) show that 
forward-looking reaction functions are empirically descriptive of the 
behavior of the major central banks since 1979; see also the estimates 
presented in the next section of this paper.  The second difference from 
the standard Taylor rule is that equation (3.1) omits the usual output 
gap term.  We do this primarily for simplicity and to reduce the number 
of dimensions along which the simulations must be varied.  There are a 
number of rationales for this omission that are worth brief mention, 
however:  First, for shocks that primarily affect aggregate demand, such 
as shocks to asset prices, rules of the form (3.1) and rules that 
include an output gap term will be essentially equivalent in their 
effects.  Second, as we will see in the next section, empirical 
estimates of the responsiveness of central banks to the output gap 
conditional on expected inflation are often rather small.  Finally, 
assuming for simulation purposes that the central bank can actually 
observe the output gap with precision probably overstates the case in 
reality; by leaving out this term we avoid the issue of how accurately 
the central bank can estimate the gap. 
  Although we do not include the output gap in the policy rule 
(3.1), because of our focus on asset price fluctuations we do consider a 
                         
15 Note also that the rule given by (3.1) abstracts from an interest-
rate smoothing motive, which appears to be important empirically; again 
see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) and the estimates in the next 
section.  Ignoring this aspect of policy makes the simulation results 
presented below look somewhat less realistic (because policy reacts “too 
quickly” to changes in the economy) but does not affect the qualitative 
nature of the results.   25
variant of (3.1) that allows the central bank to respond to changes in 
stock prices.  Specifically, as an alternative to (3.1) we assume that 
the instrument rate responds to the once-lagged log-level of the stock 
price, relative to its steady-state value: 
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Alternative interpretations of policy rules like (3.2) are discussed in 
the next section. 
We conducted a variety of simulation experiments, of which we here 
report an illustrative sampling.  We begin with simulations of the 
effects of a stock-market bubble that begins with an exogenous one 
percentage point increase in stock prices (above fundamentals).  We 
parameterize equation (2.4), which governs the bubble process, so that 
the non-fundamental component of the stock price roughly doubles each 
period, as long as the bubble persists.
16  The bubble is assumed to last 
for five periods and then burst.
17  Just before the collapse, the non-
fundamental component is worth about sixteen percent of the initial 
steady state fundamental value.     
 
Asset bubbles with policy responding only to inflation.  Figure 1 
illustrates the simulated responses of the economy
18 to the bubble under 
two policy rules of the form (3.1): an “inflation accommodating” policy 
                         
16 We assume p = 0.5 and a = 0.98. 
17 To be clear, agents in the model know only the ex ante stochastic 
process for the bubble and not the time that it will burst. 
18 All simulations are reported as deviations from the steady state.   26
for which  01 . 1 = b  and a more aggressive “inflation targeting” policy 
for which  0 . 2 = b .
19 
As Figure 1 shows, under the accommodating policy the bubble 
stimulates aggregate demand, leading the economy to “overheat”.  
Inflation and output rise sharply.  The rise in stock prices stimulates 
spending and output both through the balance sheet effects described 
earlier (notice the decline in the external finance premium in the 
figure, which stimulates borrowing) and through wealth effects on 
consumption (which are the relatively less important quantitatively).  
When the bubble bursts there is a corresponding collapse in firms’ net 
worth.  The resulting deterioration in credit markets is reflected in a 
sharp increase in the external finance premium (the spread between 
firms’ borrowing rates and the safe rate) and a rapid fall in output.  
The decline in output after the bursting of the bubble is greater than 
the initial expansion, although the “integral” of output over the 
episode is positive.  In the absence of further shocks, output does not 
continue to spiral downwards but stabilizes at a level just below the 
initial level of output.  Below we consider scenarios in which the 
collapse of a bubble is followed by a financial panic (a negative 
bubble), which causes the economy to deteriorate further. 
In contrast to the accommodative policy, Figure 1 shows that the 
more aggressive “inflation targeting” policy greatly moderates the 
effects of the bubble.  Although policy is assumed not to respond 
directly to the stock market per se, under the more aggressive rule 
interest rates are known by the public to be highly responsive to the 
                         
19 We consider the accommodating policy not because it is a realistic 
alternative, but rather to underscore the point that the impact of a   27
incipient inflationary pressures created by the bubble.  The expectation 
that interest rates will rise if output and inflation rise is sufficient 
both to dampen the response of overall asset prices to the bubble and to 
stabilize output and inflation---even though, ex post, interest rates 
are not required to move by as much as in the accommodative policy.  
 
Asset bubbles with a policy response to stock prices.  Figure 2 
shows simulation results analogous to those in Figure 1, except that now 
the central bank is allowed to respond directly to stock prices as well 
as to expected inflation.  We set the parameter x  in equation (3.2) 
equal to 0.1, implying that (for constant expected inflation) a ten 
percentage point rise in the stock market leads to a one percentage 
point rise in the instrument rate.  Of course the full response of the 
short-term rate to a stock market appreciation is greater than that, 
since policy also responds to the change in expected inflation induced 
by a bubble.
20   
Figure 2 shows that the effect of allowing policy to respond to 
stock prices depends greatly on whether policy is assumed to be 
accommodating or aggressive with respect to expected inflation.  Under 
the accommodating policy ( 01 . 1 = b ), allowing a response to stock prices 
produces a perverse outcome.  The expectation by the public that rates 
will rise in the wake of the bubble pushes down the fundamental 
component of stock prices, even though overall stock prices (inclusive 
                                                                         
bubble is highly sensitive to the response of monetary policy. 
20 Note that we assume that policy responds to the (observable) level of 
stock prices, not the (unobservable) level of the bubble, which seems 
realistic.  That distinction is not important in the present exercise 
but will become important in scenarios in which the central bank is 
uncertain about the source of the appreciation in stock prices.   28
of the bubble component) rise.  Somewhat counter-intuitively, the rise 
in rates and the decline in fundamental values actually more than offset 
the stimulative effects of the bubble, leading output and inflation to 
decline - an example of the possible “collateral” damage to the economy 
that may occur when the central bank responds to stock prices.  The 
result that the economy actually contracts, though a robust one in our 
simulations, may rely too heavily on sophisticated forward-looking 
behavior on the part of private-sector investors to be entirely 
plausible as a realistic description of the actual economy.  However, 
the general point here is, we believe a valid one; namely, that a 
monetary policy regime that focuses on asset prices rather than on 
macroeconomic fundamentals may well be actively destabilizing.  The 
problem is that the central bank is targeting the wrong indicator. 
Under the aggressive policy ( 0 . 2 = b ), in contrast, allowing 
policy to respond to the stock price does little to alter the dynamic 
responses of the economy.  Evidently, the active component of the 
monetary rule, which strongly adjusts the real rate to offset movements 
in expected inflation, compensates for perverse effects generated by the 
response of policy to stock prices. 
To recapitulate, the lesson that we take from Figure 2 is that it 
can be quite dangerous for policy simultaneously to respond to stock 
prices and to accommodate inflation.  However, when policy acts 
aggressively to stabilize expected inflation, whether policy also 
responds independently to stock prices is not of great consequence.  
As an alternative metric for evaluating policy responses to 
bubbles we also computed the unconditional variances of output and 
inflation under the four different policy scenarios (accommodative   29
versus non-accommodative on inflation, responding to stock prices versus 
not responding).  We considered bubbles lasting one, two, and three 
periods, weighting them in the population according to their relative 
likelihood of being realized (conditional on a bubble starting.)  The 
left panel of Table 1 reports the results.  The table shows that a 
policy of focusing aggressively on inflation and ignoring stock prices 
does best by a significant margin, achieving the lowest unconditional 
variance of both output and inflation.
21   
 
Asset bubble then asset bust.  So far in the simulations we have 
assumed that, after the collapse of the bubble, asset prices are again 
governed solely by fundamentals.  With this assumption we tend to find 
that a stock-price crash wipes out the output gains from the bubble but 
not much more; there is only a slight overreaction in the decline in 
output.
22 
An alternative scenario, which may be of the greatest concern to 
policymakers, is that the collapse of a bubble might damage investor 
confidence sufficiently to set off a panic in financial markets.  We 
model this possibility in a simple way by assuming that the crash of the 
bubble sets off a negative bubble in stock prices (an undervaluation) 
that is exactly symmetric with the positive bubble that preceded it.  
This panic is unanticipated by investors before it happens.  If we 
maintain the assumption that the initial, positive bubble lasts five 
                         
21 Under the usual assumption that social welfare depends on the output 
gap and inflation, we can therefore unambiguously conclude that the 
inflation-targeting rule maximizes welfare. 
22 The model does not include raw-material or finished-goods 
inventories.  Inclusion of inventory stocks in the model would likely 
increase the downward reaction, by adding an endogenous inventory cycle.   30
periods before popping, then this alternative scenario implies a ten-
period “boom-bust” scenario. 
Figure 3 shows simulation results under the accommodative 
( 01 . 1 = b ) and aggressive ( 0 . 2 = b ) policy rules, and assuming no direct 
response of policy to stock price movements ( 0 = x ).  The positive 
bubble followed by the negative bubble sets off an oscillation in both 
financial markets and the general economy.  However, the magnitude of 
the oscillation depends critically on the type of monetary policy 
employed.  Under the accommodative policy the cycle is large, whereas 
the more aggressive policy significantly dampens the oscillation.  By 
strongly targeting expected inflation, monetary policy stabilizes 
aggregate demand and thus greatly reduces the economic effects of the 
volatility in stock prices. 
Note that in the experiment we assume that the negative asset 
bubble arises after the initial crash, regardless of the policy 
environment. However, if there is some connection between market 
psychology and fundamentals (e.g., markets overreact to movements in 
fundamentals), and if financial market participants perceive policy has 
been effective in stabilizing fundamentals, then perhaps the panic might 
not arise in the first place.  Put differently, an added benefit of the 
aggressive policy, not accounted for in our simulations, might be to 
reduce the overall likelihood of the follow-on panic. 
 
Implications of reduced leverage.  As we mentioned earlier, in a 
model with a financial accelerator the impact of the bubble on real 
activity also depends on initial financial conditions, such as the 
degree of leverage among borrowers.  Figure 4 explores the impact of a   31
lower steady-state leverage ratio, 25% instead of 50% as in the baseline 
scenario.  The figure shows that a reduction in leverage significantly 
moderates the cycle.  Besides its reaffirmation of the superiority of 
inflation-focused monetary policy, this simulation also suggests a 
rationale for regulatory and tax policies that discourage excessive 
leverage.   
 
Asset-price fluctuations arising from a mixture of fundamental and 
non-fundamental sources.  We saw in Figure 2 that allowing monetary 
policy to respond to asset prices can be destabilizing, particularly if 
policy is accommodative of inflation.  The costs of targeting asset 
prices are probably greater in practice than suggested by the bubble 
scenario of Figure 2, because it is quite difficult or impossible for 
the central bank to discern whether changes in asset prices reflect 
fundamental forces, non-fundamental forces, or a combination of both.  
To the extent that asset price movements reflect fundamental forces, 
they should be accommodated rather than resisted; attempts to 
“stabilize” asset prices in that case are directly counterproductive.  
To illustrate these issues, we consider a scenario in which 
improvements in productivity generate a rise in market fundamentals, as 
well as increasing potential output.  However, a euphoric response to 
the fundamental boom also sets off a bubble.  Specifically, we suppose 
that there is a one percent permanent increase in productivity which is 
followed one period later by the inception of a stock-price bubble, 
which we again assume lasts for five periods.  Figure 5 shows the 
results, comparing an aggressive inflation stabilization policy with one 
that also allows for responses to stock prices.  As the figure shows, in   32
this scenario tightening policy in response to the increase in asset 
prices prevents output from rising by the amount of the increase in 
potential output.  In other words, responding to the rise in asset 
prices has the undesirable effect of temporarily stifling the beneficial 
impact of the technology boom. 
We explore the issue a bit further by calculating the 
unconditional variability of the output gap (output minus potential 
output) under the four different policy scenarios, assuming in this case 
that only a productivity shock has buffeted the economy.
23  The right 
panel of Table 1 reports the results.  As with the case of bubble 
shocks, the results indicate that the policy that responds aggressively 
to inflation and does not target stock prices works best.  
 
A shock to the external finance premium.  The last scenario we 
consider is a disruption of financial markets that temporarily tightens 
credit conditions.  A real-world example is the default on Russian bonds 
in the fall of 1998 that induced significant capital losses for key bank 
creditors and drove up premiums on long-term corporate bonds.
24  The 
analogue in our model is a shock that drives up the premium for external 
finance, holding constant firm balance-sheet positions; formally this 
can be modeled as a decline in the efficiency of the financial 
intermediation process (see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 
forthcoming).  Figure 6 shows the responses of output and inflation to 
an exogenous fifty-basis-point rise in the external finance premium, 
                         
23 That is, for simplicity here we do not include a confounding bubble 
shock.  The welfare comparisons would not be affected by including a 
bubble shock. 
24 For evidence that general credit conditions tightened at this time,   33
under both the aggressive and accommodative policy rules (it is assumed 
here that policy does not respond to asset prices).  The figure shows 
clearly that the aggressive policy response works best.  We believe that 
this experiment helps to provide a rationale for the Fed’s intervention 
in the fall of 1998.  Basically, because the rise in the spread observed 
at that time had a potentially deflationary effect on the economy, it 
was appropriate to ease policy in response. 
 
 
Section IV.  Estimated Reaction Functions for the Federal Reserve and 
the Bank of Japan 
    
Section III considered the stabilizing properties of various 
hypothetical interest rate rules for central banks.  These experiments 
raise the question of what rules (reaction functions) best describe the 
actual practice of contemporary central banks.  In practice, do central 
banks react to forecasts of inflation and the output gap in a 
stabilizing manner?  And do they react to stock prices, over and above 
the reaction to stock prices implied by the pursuit of output and 
inflation stabilization? 
In this section we apply the methods of Clarida, Gertler, and Gali 
(1998, forthcoming), henceforth CGG, to estimate forward-looking 
reaction functions for the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan for the 
period since 1979.  To preview the results, we find that the Fed has 
largely followed our advice over the past two decades, reacting in a 
strongly stabilizing manner to changes in the inflation forecast and the 
expected output gap but, for the most part, not reacting to changes in 
stock prices (except to the extent that they contain information about 
                                                                         
see Gertler and Lown (1999).   34
inflation and output).  The record of the Bank of Japan is less 
satisfactory, by our estimates:  We find that easy monetary policy in 
Japan actively fueled the increase in stock prices during the 1987-89 
period.  After the stock market crashed in 1990, Japanese monetary 
policy appeared to make some attempt to support stock prices but failed 
to react sufficiently aggressively to the declining rate of inflation.  
Consequently, Japanese monetary policy was too tight from late 1992 at 
least until the beginning of 1996.  To some extent, it should be noted, 
these problems reflected the very slow rate of adjustment of nominal 
interest rates in the face of changing macroeconomic conditions. 
CGG’s approach, which we follow here, is to estimate forward-
looking reaction functions of the form 
 







t r  is the targeted value of the nominal instrument rate (the 
federal funds rate for the U.S., the call rate for Japan); r  is the 
long-run equilibrium nominal rate;  ) (
*
12 p p - + t t E  is the expected 
deviation of inflation from its target rate over the next twelve months; 
) (
*
t t t y y E -  is the contemporaneous value of the output gap, conditional 
on information available to the central bank at time t; and  t z  
represents other variables that may affect the target interest rate.  We 
expect the parameters b  and g  to be positive; CGG point out that 
stabilization of inflation further requires  1 > b , i.e., for the real 
interest rate to rise when expected inflation rises, the nominal   35
interest rate must be raised by more than the increase in expected 
inflation.  In practice, values of b  for central banks with 
significant emphasis on inflation stabilization are estimated to be 
closer to 2.0.  Values less than 1.3 or so indicate a weak commitment to 
inflation stabilization (at these values of b the real interest rate 
moves relatively little in response to changes in expected inflation). 
Because of unmodeled motives for interest-rate smoothing, 
adjustment of the actual nominal interest rate towards its target may be 
gradual.  CGG allow for this by assuming a partial adjustment mechanism, 
e.g.,  
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where  t r  is the actual nominal interest rate and  ) 1 , 0 [ ˛ r  captures the 
degree of interest-rate smoothing.  Below we follow CGG in assuming a 
first-order partial adjustment mechanism, as in equation (4.2), for 
Japan and a second-order partial adjustment mechanism for the United 
States. 
To estimate the reaction function implied by equations (4.1) and 
(4.2), CGG replace the expectations of variables in equation (4.1) with 
actual realized values of the variables, then apply an instrumental 
variables methodology, using as instruments only variables known at time 
t-1 or earlier.  Under the assumption of rational expectations, 
expectational errors will be uncorrelated with the instruments, so that   36
the IV procedure produces consistent estimates of the reaction function 
parameters.
25   
Estimation results are shown in Table 2 for the Federal Reserve 
and Table 3 for the Bank of Japan.  Following CGG, we begin the U.S. 
sample period in 1979:10, the date of the Volcker regime shift, and the 
Japanese sample period in 1979:04, a period CGG refer to as one of 
“significant financial deregulation”.  The end date in each case is 
1997:12 (our data end in 1998:12 but we must allow for the fact that one 
year of future price change is included on the right-hand side).
26  We 
also look at two sub-samples for Japan, the periods before and after 
1989:6.  It was at the end of 1989 that increases in Bank of Japan 
interest rates were followed by the collapse of stock prices and land 
values. 
                         
25 More specifically, CGG apply a GMM estimator with a correction 
for the moving average error induced by overlapping forecasts (see their 
footnote 11 for details).  Our estimation procedure follows the CGG 
method very closely, with minor differences described below. In 
particular, we follow CGG in using as instruments a constant, and lags 
1-6, 9, and 12 of log-differenced commodity price index, the log-
differenced CPI, the log-differenced output gap, and the instrument 
interest rate.  For Japan, lags 1-6, 9 and 12 of the real yen-dollar 
exchange rate are also included as instruments.  For the commodity price 
index we use slightly different series from CGG, specifically, an IMF 
series for Japan and the Dow-Jones commodity price index for the United 
States.  In auxiliary regressions, discussed below, we also use lags 1 
to 6 of the log-difference of the stock price index (TOPIX in Japan and 
the S&P 500 for the United States). 
Following CGG, we construct the output gap for the United States 
as the residuals of a regression of industrial production on a constant, 
time, and time squared, for the sample period 1960:1 through 1998:12.  
Because we believe that Japan has been well below potential output since 
about 1990, the output gap variable we construct for Japan is based on a 
quadratic trend for industrial production based on data beginning in 
1968:1 and ending in 1989:6.  Through 1989:6 the Japanese output gap is 
measured as the residual from this regression, subsequently it is 
equated to actual output less the extrapolated quadratic trend value of 
output. 
We thank Richard Clarida for providing the estimation programs. 
26 Estimates (not shown) from samples ending in 1994:12, the end date 
used by CGG, closely replicated their results.   37
For each country and sample period the tables report two 
specifications.  As in CGG, the baseline specification shows the 
response of the target for the instrument interest rate to the expected 
output gap and expected inflation.  The second, alternative 
specification adds to the reaction function the current value and five 
lags of the log-difference of an index of the stock market (the S&P 500 
for the United States and the TOPIX index for Japan).  To help control 
for simultaneity bias, we instrument for the contemporaneous log-
difference in the stock market index; in particular, we add lags 1 
through 6 of the log-difference of the stock market index to our list of 
instruments (see footnote 20).  Note therefore that, in these estimates, 
the responses of policy to stock market returns arising from the 
predictive power of stock returns for output and inflation are fully 
accounted for; any estimated response of policy to stock returns must 
therefore be over and above the part due to the predictive power of 
stock returns. 
There are two ways to think about the addition of stock market 
returns to the reaction function:  The first is to interpret it 
literally as saying that monetary policy is reacting directly to stock 
prices, as well as to the output gap and expected inflation.  The second 
is to treat the addition of stock returns as a general specification 
test that reveals whether monetary policy is pursuing other objectives 
besides stabilization of output and expected inflation.  To the extent 
that policy has other objectives, and there is information about these 
objectives in the stock market, then we would expect to see stock 
returns enter the central bank’s reaction function with a statistically 
significant coefficient.   38
For the United States, the estimates of the baseline reaction 
function (first line of Table 2) indicate that over the full sample 
period the Fed responded reasonably strongly to changes in forecasted 
inflation ( ) 60 . 1 = b .  It also reacted in a stabilizing manner to 
forecasts of the output gap ( 14 . 0 = g ).  Both parameter estimates are 
highly statistically significant.  The CGG procedure also permits 
estimation of the implied target rate of inflation (see their paper); 
for the U.S., the estimated target inflation rate for the full period is 
2.88% per year.  Figure 7 shows that the actual and fitted values of the 
federal funds rate are very close for the full sample period.
27 
In the results reported in the second line of Table 2 we allow for 
the possibility that the Fed responded to stock market returns 
information contained in stock market returns), independently of their 
implication for forecasts of inflation and the output gap.  The 
estimated response of the funds rate to stock returns, -0.08, is 
relatively small, the “wrong” sign (if we think of the Fed as being 
tempted to try to stabilize stock prices), and statistically 
insignificant.  Other parameter estimates are largely unchanged from the 
baseline specification.  The force of these estimates is that, 
consistent with the advice we give in this paper, the Fed has focused 
its attention on expected inflation and the output gap and has neither 
actively sought to stabilize stock prices nor reacted to information in 
stock returns other than that useful for forecasting the output gap and 
inflation. 
                         
27 The fitted values assume that expected inflation and the expected 
output gap are the realized values.  They are thus comparable to the 
target values reported in Figure 8; see below.   39
To help put the Fed’s behavior into its historical context, Figure 
8 shows the actual value and the estimated target value of the federal 
funds rate for the period January 1984 to the present.  The target value 
differs from the fitted value in that the latter incorporates the 
interest-rate smoothing parameters and the former implicitly sets these 
to zero, i.e., the target value is the interest rate given by equation 
(4.1).   For this figure the target value at each date is calculated 
assuming that the Fed had perfect knowledge of the current output gap 
and inflation over the next year; we do this in order to concentrate on 
intentional deviations of policy from the average reaction function, as 
opposed to deviations driven primarily by forecast errors.  Because the 
target value abstracts from the interest-rate smoothing motive, there is 
a tendency for the actual rate to lag somewhat behind the target.  
Nevertheless, Figure 8 suggests that the Fed’s actual choice of short-
term rates followed target rates reasonably closely. 
There are, however, three periods of deviation of the actual fed 
funds rate from the target rate in Figure 8 that deserve comment.   
  First, as was much remarked at the time, the Fed did not ease 
policy in 1985-86, even though a sharp decline in oil prices reduced 
inflation during those years.
28  The view expressed by some contemporary 
observers was that the Fed made a conscious decision in 1986 to enjoy 
the beneficial supply shock in the form of a lower inflation rate rather 
than real economic expansion.  However, it is also likely that much of 
the decline in inflation in 1986 was unanticipated, contrary to the 
perfect foresight assumption made in constructing the figure.  If true, 
                         
28 Kozicki (1999) observes however that this gap is greatly reduced if a 
core inflation measure is used in the estimation of the Fed’s reaction 
function.   40
this would account for much of the deviation of actual rates from target 
in 1985.   
Second, the Fed kept rates somewhat below target in the aftermath 
of the 1987 stock market crash.  Again, forecasting errors may account 
for this deviation; the Fed was concerned at the time that the 
depressing effects of the crash would be larger than in fact they turned 
out to be.   
Finally, and most interesting to us, the Fed kept the funds rate 
significantly below target from late 1991 until the beginning of 1995.  
This was a period of slow recovery from the 1990-91 recession, which Fed 
officials argued was caused by financial “headwinds”, such as excessive 
corporate leverage and bank capital problems.  We interpret the 1991-95 
easing as being consistent with our advice, in that the Fed was 
concerned about financial conditions not for themselves but primarily 
for their implications for the macroeconomy.
29  In the event, though, it 
appears that the Fed eased by more than necessary in this period.
30,31 
                         
29 Kozicki (1999) makes a similar observation and provides support for 
her contention with the following revealing quote from Chairman 
Greenspan: 
  “In the spring of 1989, we began to ease monetary conditions as we 
observed the consequence of balance-sheet strains resulting from 
increased debt, along with significant weakness in the collateral 
underlying that debt.  Households and businesses began much more 
reluctant to borrow and spend and lenders to extend credit – a 
phenomenon often referred to as the ‘credit crunch’.  In an endeavor to 
defuse these financial strains we moved short-term rates lower in a long 
series of steps that ended in the late summer of 1992, and we held them 
at unusually low levels through the end of 1993 – both absolutely and, 
importantly, relative to inflation.” (Testimony of June 22, 1994). 
30 An alternative interpretation, which is consistent with our general 
approach, is that financial conditions in certain key sectors and 
regions were sufficiently bad—e.g., bank capital positions well below 
regulatory minima—that the impact of small interest-rate changes on the 
economy was reduced.  A reduction in the policy multiplier would justify 
more aggressive Fed policies during this period. 
31 Our sample period does not include the episode of Fall 1998, when the 
Fed reacted to increased quality spreads in the bond market by easing.    41
We turn now to the case of Japan.  For the entire sample period, 
estimates of the Bank of Japan’s reaction function (Table 3) look 
qualitatively similar to those found for the Fed.  For the whole 1979-
1997 period, we estimate that the Bank of Japan responded actively to 
both expected inflation ( 21 . 2 = b ) and to the output gap ( 20 . 0 = g ).  The 
equation also fits the data quite well (Figure 9).
32  However, 
inspection of the data suggests two very different economic and policy 
regimes during this period:  the so-called “bubble economy” of the 
1980s, during which the economy and asset prices boomed, and the period 
since 1990 during which asset prices have collapsed and the economy has 
been extremely weak.  Accordingly, and keeping in mind the problems 
inherent in estimation based on small samples, we re-estimated the Bank 
of Japan’s reaction function for the period before and after 1989:06.  
The date was chosen to separate the periods before and after the 
accession of Governor Mieno, who instigated a significant policy 
tightening at the end of 1989. 
Table 3 shows that, for the first half of the sample period, the 
Bank of Japan remained committed to stabilization of inflation ( 00 . 2 = b  
in the baseline specification,  85 . 1 = b  in the specification including 
stock returns).  However, the specification including stock returns also 
shows that, wittingly or unwittingly, the Bank of Japan was also 
strongly reinforcing the asset price explosion:  The estimated reaction 
of the Japanese call rate to stock returns over the past six months is  
                                                                         
Again, this action seems justifiable to us, in that the widening spreads 
could well have been interpreted as predicting a slowdown in the general 
economy. 
32 The fitted values again assume perfect foresight by the central bank 
for inflation and the output gap.   42
–0.286 in the first half of the sample, with a standard error of 0.111.  
This says that each 10% increase in stock prices was associated with a 
286-basis-point decline in the call rate - a number too large to be 
taken seriously, but an indication that policy was destabilizing toward 
the stock market prior to 1989.  As noted, we do not necessarily 
interpret these results as saying that the Bank was actively attempting 
to raise stock prices.  But it does seem that the Bank was pursuing 
objectives other than output and inflation stabilization (exchange 
rates?) which led it to ease excessively, and the stock market reflected 
that ease.
33 
For the second half of the sample, the results are much different.  
As the bottom third of Table 3 indicates, after 1989 the Bank of Japan 
greatly weakened its commitment to inflation stabilization ( 12 . 1 = b  in 
the baseline stabilization).  We interpret the low estimated value of 
b , together with the negative estimated values of the inflation 
target, as indicating that the Bank was not actively resisting the 
powerful deflationary forces of this period.  However, our estimates 
suggest that the Bank may have been attempting to stabilize the stock 
market, or some other factor proxied by the stock market; the estimated 
reaction of the call rate to stock market returns switches from the 
large negative value in the earlier subsample to a large and highly 
significant positive value ( 188 . 0 = x ).  From the perspective of the 
arguments advanced in this paper, the Bank of Japan would have done 
                         
33 Note that it would not be correct to argue that stock prices matter 
because of their predictive power for the output gap and inflation.  We 
include stock returns in the information sets for forecasting these 
variables, thereby controlling for the predictive power of stock 
returns.   43
better to focus instead on stabilizing the inflation rate (in this case, 
preventing the plunge into deflation) than in responding to other 
factors. 
Again a picture helps to provide historical context.  In analogy 
to Figure 8, Figure 10 shows the actual call money rate and the 
estimated target rate in Japan after 1984.  In this case, unlike in 
Figure 8, we calculate the target rate using the reaction function 
estimated for the pre-1989:07 sample, without stock returns.  This 
reaction function seems the right one to use as a benchmark, since it 
implies strongly stabilizing monetary policy, as suggested by the 
simulations in the previous section.  Thus the target rate for the post-
1989 period in Figure 10 indicates what policy would have been if the 
earlier policies had been continued, with no attention paid to stock 
returns (except as forecasters of the output gap and inflation). 
The results are again quite interesting.  The target rate in Japan 
changed sharply during several episodes, and - possibly as a result of 
an excessive attachment to interest-rate smoothing - the actual call 
rate lagged far behind.  Figure 10 suggests that policy was on the whole 
rather tight in Japan during the 1985-87 period, despite the easing that 
followed the Plaza Agreement of September 1985.  From 1987-89, however, 
Japan faced strong inflationary pressures (including rocketing asset 
prices and rapid real growth), to which the Bank of Japan responded 
extremely slowly.
34  No doubt it is this period that is responsible for 
                         
34 Figure 10 suggests that the Bank of Japan should have raised its key 
interest rate as high as 8-10% during 1987-89, which some commentators 
at the conference thought would not have been politically feasible given 
that contemporaneous inflation (possibly as a result of exchange rate 
appreciation) remained low.  Our specific measure of the target rate is 
sensitive to our estimates of the size of the output gap in Japan at the 
time and is not to be treated as precise.  What is striking about the   44
our estimated result that monetary policy actively destabilized the 
stock market in the pre-1990 period. 
Rates began to rise sharply following the appointment of Governor 
Mieno in December 1989, and continued to rise until the spring of 1991.  
The rate increase was undertaken with the intention of curbing the stock 
market and - like many other attempts to prick market bubbles, including 
the U.S. boom in 1929 - the attempt was too successful for the good of 
the economy.  Asset prices collapsed; and because Japan’s financial 
arrangements were particularly sensitive to asset values (we would 
argue), the real economy collapsed as well. 
Our estimates of the Bank of Japan’s reaction function for the 
second half of the sample suggest two countervailing forces:  On the one 
hand, there was now some attempt to stabilize the stock market, or some 
factor proxied by the stock market, by cutting rates as the market fell.  
On the other hand, the Bank of Japan’s commitment to stabilizing 
inflation (here, resisting deflation) seems to have become much weaker.  
The net effect was policy that was significantly too tight, at least 
until the beginning of 1996.
35 
We do not want to overstate the conclusions that can be drawn from 
this short comparison of U.S. and Japanese monetary policy since the 
mid-1980s.  The comparative experience is at least suggestive however 
that focusing on the traditional goals of monetary policy - the output 
                                                                         
period is not that the BOJ failed to tighten radically, but that it 
failed to tighten at all.  In any case, for the record, we consider the 
failure to respond to deflationary pressures during 1992-96 (see below) 
to be the most serious shortcoming of Japanese monetary policy during 
this period. 
35 As can be seen in Figure 10, the target call rate went negative in 
1993, out of the feasible range of the actual rate.  Still, it was not 
until 1995 that the actual call rate went below 2.0%.   45
gap and expected inflation - is the more effective means of avoiding 
extended swings in asset prices and the resulting damage to the economy. 
 
Section V.   Conclusion 
In order to explore the issue of how monetary policy should 
respond to variability in asset prices, we incorporated non-fundamental 
movements in asset prices into a dynamic macroeconomic framework.  To a 
first approximation at least, we believe that our framework captures the 
main concerns that policy-makers have about possible bubbles in asset 
prices.  In particular, in our model a large positive bubble exposes the 
economy to the risk of a sharp market correction, with adverse effects 
on aggregate demand and economic activity.  In the absence of an 
appropriate policy response the resulting economic contraction could be 
quite large.  A severe market drop in our model also weakens balance 
sheets, induces financial distress, leads to further declines in asset 
prices, and widens spreads in bond markets.  Although our framework 
omits some of the microeconomic details of episodes of stress (e.g., 
non-price credit rationing, reduced liquidity of financial markets), and 
hence is silent about certain types of lender-of-last-resort 
interventions that the central bank might undertake, we believe that 
these omissions are unlikely to affect our central conclusions about 
aggregate stabilization policy.
36   
The principal conclusion of this paper has been stated several 
times:  In brief, it is that flexible inflation-targeting provides an 
effective, unified framework for achieving both general macroeconomic 
                         
36 Further, to the extent that (say) collapse of the banking system 
would be deflationary, perhaps in a highly discontinuous way, it seems 
to us that lender-of-last resort interventions are consistent with the   46
stability and financial stability.  Given a strong commitment to 
stabilizing expected inflation, it is neither necessary nor desirable 
for monetary policy to respond to changes in asset prices, except to the 
extent that they help to forecast inflationary or deflationary 
pressures. 
A couple of additional issues deserve very brief comment.  First, 
our implicit focus in this paper has been on large industrial economies 
like the United States and Japan.  However, many of the recent financial 
crises around the world have occurred in small open economies, with 
international capital flows and attacks on the currency playing major 
roles.  What lessons does our analysis bear for these countries? 
More work would need to be done to extend our model to the open-
economy case, and to include other sources of financial crisis such as 
speculative attacks on the currency and bank runs.  Such an extension 
would be worthwhile, we believe, because it seems to us that balance-
sheet effects of the type captured in the BGG model have played an 
important role in propagating the effects of financial crises through 
the real economy.  Although we have not yet done such an extension, one 
likely conclusion from such an exercise seems obvious enough and 
important enough to be worth stating now, viz.:  The logic of our 
approach suggests strongly that fixed exchange rates, as maintained by 
many of the countries recently hit by financial crises, are highly 
undesirable in a financially fragile environment. 
The key problem with an exchange-rate peg is that its defense 
generally requires movements in interest rates that are perverse, 
relative to the objective of containing a financial crisis.  In 
                                                                         
philosophy of flexible inflation targeting.   47
particular, the large increases in interest rates necessary to avert 
devaluation during a currency crisis exacerbate financial crises both 
directly, by depressing asset prices, reducing corporate profits, and 
putting pressure on banks, and also indirectly, by slowing current and 
expected rates of economic activity.  In addition, fixed-exchange-rate 
regimes severely limit the short-run discretion of the central bank, 
either to assist the financial system (for example, through lender-of-
last-resort activities) or to correct short-term imbalances in the 
economy.   48
 Indeed, the record of fixed-exchange regimes in regard to the 
incidence and severity of financial crises is notoriously bad.
37  During 
the Great Depression currency crises (possible, of course, only if the 
exchange rate is fixed), banking panics, and stock market crashes 
frequently occurred together.  Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, 
every one of the dozens of major banking panics of that era occurred in 
a country that was attempting to defend a fixed rate (its gold parity).  
For the postwar period, in a study spanning the 1970s through the 1990s, 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) document that banking and currency crises 
frequently occurred together and appeared to be mutually reinforcing.  
The strong observed association between fixed exchange rates and 
financial crises appears to be weakened only under two conditions:  
First, if international capital flows are highly regulated and 
restricted, as was the case for example during the Bretton Woods era; or 
second, if the international monetary system is cooperatively managed by 
the major central banks, as was arguably the case during the classical 
gold standard of the late nineteenth century (Eichengreen, 1992).  
Neither of these conditions prevails today. 
  So what should small open economies do?  Our analysis suggests 
that, if possible, they adopt flexible inflation targeting, as part of a 
broad reform package that includes improved financial regulation and 
fiscal reform.
38  (Brazil has recently proposed a plan along these 
lines.)  The last part of the recommendation bears emphasis:  Change in 
the monetary regime alone, without support from the regulatory and 
                         
37 For an even broader indictment of fixed-exchange-rate regimes see 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). 
38 Dollarization or a currency union represent an alternative approach 
for small open economies that also avoids the instabilities of fixed   49
fiscal arms of government, is not likely to be sufficient.  Moreover, we 
recognize that successful implementation of inflation targeting requires 
both ample political support from the government and a certain amount of 
institutional development, e.g., the existence of adequate price indexes 
(see Eichengreen et al, 1999).  With these caveats, we recommend that 
small open economies head in an inflation-targeting direction.  Note 
that, along with providing enhanced macroeconomic and financial 
stability, a commitment to an inflation-targeting approach by a small 
open economy could well deliver greater long-run stability of the 
nominal exchange rate than a regime that attempts to fix the exchange 
rate but suffers frequent forced devaluations. 
  A second broad issue not yet addressed here concerns the 
difference between implicit inflation targeting, of the type practiced 
by the Greenspan Fed, and explicit inflation targeting, which involves 
considerable additional transparency and communication with the public.  
It is evident from recent U.S. experience that implicit inflation 
targeting can give good results, and indeed our simulations help to show 
why a strong focus on stabilizing expected inflation promotes overall 
macroeconomic and financial stability.  We nevertheless do believe that 
the U.S. would benefit from a move to explicit inflation targeting, for 
at least two reasons (see Bernanke et al, 1999, for further discussion).  
First, making inflation targeting explicit would serve the important 
goal of ensuring continuity in monetary policy, or at least of 
increasing the likelihood that future policy would take the same general 
approach as recent policy has taken.  In particular, if the inflation-
targeting regime were made explicit, the transition from the current 
                                                                         
exchange rates.  These approaches have their own problems, however.   50
chairman to the next one would create less anxiety in financial markets 
and for the economy than otherwise.  Second, transparency enhances the 
stabilizing properties of forward-looking policies.  In particular, in 
the simulations reported in this paper we implicitly assumed 
transparency of policy, in that private-sector actors were assumed to 
know the policy rule.  The results might be very different if, for 
example, we assumed that private agents thought the central bank was 
following the accommodative rule when in fact it was following the more 
aggressive inflation-targeting policy.  Likewise, much of the 
stabilizing effect of our recommended policy arises because investors 
expect the central bank to raise interest rates when rising asset prices 
threaten to overheat the economy, and vice versa if declining asset 
prices threaten to induce an economic contraction.  From the standpoint 
of maintaining both macroeconomic and financial stability in the future, 
the desirability of increased transparency in U.S. monetary policymaking 
is a topic deserving of close attention in the Fed’s planning. 
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Appendix.   Equations of the simulation model 
 
The model used for simulations in section 3 is given and briefly 
described below.  To conserve space we do not review the individual and 
firm optimization problems that underlie the behavioral equations and 
instead refer the reader to Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 
(forthcoming) for details.  What we present here is the log-linearized 
versions of the model equations that were used in the simulations.  
Except for the addition of an exogenous bubble in the asset price, the 
model is essentially the same as in BGG.  The only other significant 
differences are that we use Gali and Gertler’s (forthcoming) variant of 
the new Keynesian Phillips curve and that we calibrate the wealth 
effects on consumption to match the evidence presented by Ludvigson and 
Steindel (1999). 
Throughout we follow the convention of writing steady-state levels 
of the variables in upper case and log-deviations from the steady state 
in lower case.  Greek letters and lower-case Roman letters without 
subscripts denote fixed parameters, and subscripts denote time periods.  
The expectation given information known as of period s of the value of 
variable x in period r  is written  r sx E .   
 
Aggregate demand 
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Equation (A.1) is the log-linearized version of the national 
income identity.  We distinguish between consumption of households, C , 
and consumption of entrepreneurs/firm-owners, 
e C ; otherwise the 
notation is standard.  (A.2) is the usual Euler condition for household 
consumption.  (A.3) embodies the assumption that changes in 
entrepreneurial consumption are proportional to changes in stock values; 
in the simulations we normalize entrepreneurs’ net worth so that the 
elasticity of entrepreneurial consumption to stock market wealth is 
about 0.04, as suggested by estimates in Ludvigson and Steindel (1999). 
(A.4) relates investment to the fundamental value of capital, embodying 
a one-period delay for planning new investment. 
 
Returns to stocks and capital 
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  Equation (A.5) describes the expected evolution of the bubble, cf. 
(2.4) and recall  ). 1 ( d - ”b a   Note that the realized value of the   59
bubble, conditional on not bursting, is defined by 
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. Equation (A.6) defines the fundamental return 
to capital as the sum of the current return to capital and the increase 
in fundamental value, where mc is the marginal cost of production 
(equal to the inverse of the markup) and  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( d d J
a - + - = K
Y  where a  is 
capital’s share.  (A.7) defines the returns to stocks analogously.  
(A.8) shows that the relationship between the stock return and the 
fundamental return depends on the presence of the bubble; cf. (2.6).  
Equation (A.9) links the spread between safe returns and stock returns 
to firm leverage, where n is the log-deviation of firms’ internal 
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  Equation (A.10) is a Cobb-Douglas production function, where z  is 
the log-deviation of total factor productivity from its steady-state 
value and l is labor input.  (A.11) is the first-order condition for 
households’ labor-leisure decision, where c  is a parameter of the 
utility function (we assume log utility so that the coefficient on 
consumption in (A.11) is one).  (A.12) describes the evolution of 
inflation when prices are changed stochastically as in Calvo (1983) and   60
a subset of firms use rule-of-thumb pricing as in Gali and Gertler 
(forthcoming).  If  1 = f q  and  0 = b q  then (A.12) is the fully rational, 
forward-looking version of the Phillips curve with exogenously sticky 
prices.  Allowing  1 > b q  introduces a backward-looking element and hence 
additional inertia into the inflation process. 
 
Evolution of state variables and shock processes 
(A.13)  t t t k i k ) 1 ( 1 d d - + = +    
(A.14)  ]
) 1 (
) ( [ 1 1 - - +
-















     
(A.15) 
g
t t g t g g e r + = -1  
(A.16) 
z
t t z t z z e r + = -1  
 
  Equations (A.13) and (A.14) describe the evolution of the two 
state variables of the model, capital and internal equity respectively. 
t  is the probability that a given firm survives into the next period.  
Equations (A.15) and (A.16) state that government spending and total 
factor productivity follow first-order autoregressive processes. 
 
Monetary policy rule and interest-rate determination 
(A.17)  1 + + = t t
n n
t E r r p b  
(A.18)  1 + - = t t
n
t t E r r p  
 
  (A.17) is one example of an interest-rate rule for monetary 
policy; cf. equation (3.1).  (A.18) defines the real interest rate.   61
  Key parameter values include  2 . 0 =
Y
G
,  5 . 0 =
K
N




,  0 . 1 = s , 
025 . 0 = d  per quarter,  98 . 0 = a ,  99 . 0 = b , ) 025 . 0 1 ( 98 . 0 - = b ,  33 . 0 = a , 
05 . 0 = y ,  25 . 0 = j ,  086 . 0 = k ,  5 . 0 = f q ,  5 . 0 = b q ,  95 . 0 = t , 33 . 1 = c . 
Any parameters not reported are as in BGG.  62
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Notes:  Shown are the unconditional variances of the output gap and 
inflation under different policy rules, for bubble shocks and technology 
shocks. A new bubble starts every period, and its size is randomly drawn 
from a standard normal distribution. The probability that a bubble will 
last one, two or three periods is respectively 0.5/0.875, 0.25/0.875, 
and 0.25/0.875, reflecting the relative probabilities of each duration 
when p = 0.5. Technology shocks are permanent and are randomly drawn 




TABLE 2:  FEDERAL RESERVE REACTION FUNCTIONS 
 




1          1.60      0.14      1.27      -0.34       --     2.88     
                  (0.15)    (0.04)    (0.02)     (0.02) 
      
Adding stock       1.71      0.20      1.27      -0.33     -.082
3    2.79 
   returns
2        (0.23)    (0.07)    (0.02)     (0.02)    (0.37) 
 
Sample period: 79:10 – 97:12 
 
 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the federal funds rate.  The output 
gap is measured as the residuals from a regression of industrial 
production on time and time squared for the period 1960:1-1998:12.  
Estimates are by GMM with correction for MA(12) autocorrelation.  The 
optimal weighting matrix is obtained from first-step 2SLS parameter 
estimates. 
2 c tests for overidentifying restrictions are easily passed 
(p > 0.95) in all specifications. 
 
1The instrument set includes a constant, plus lags 1-6, 9, and 12 of 
log-differenced commodity prices (Dow-Jones), log-differenced CPI, log-
differenced output gap, and the federal funds rate. 
2The instrument set is the same as above plus lags 1-6 of the log-
differenced change in stock prices. 
3Sum of the coefficients on lags 0-5 inclusive of the log-differenced 
change in stock prices.  The reported standard error is for the sum of 
the coefficients.  The p-value for the hypothesis that all six 
coefficients are equal to zero is 0.021.   64
 
 
TABLE 3:  BANK OF JAPAN REACTION FUNCTIONS 
 




1             2.21        0.20        0.95         --       1.73 
                    (0.23)      (0.05)     (0.006) 
 
Adding stock         2.25        0.21        0.95       -0.006
3     1.88 
   returns
2          (0.29)      (0.05)     (0.006)      (0.099) 
 




1             2.00        0.33        0.95         --        2.12 
                    (0.22)      (0.11)      (0.006) 
 
Adding stock         1.85        0.39        0.96       -0.286
3     1.59 
   returns
2         (0.21)      (0.11)      (0.004)      (0.111) 
 




1            1.12        0.30       0.94           --      -3.39 
                    (0.15)      (0.02)     (0.004) 
 
Adding stock         1.24        0.30       0.95         0.188
3    -1.56 
   returns
2         (0.13)
       (0.02)     (0.003)      (0.035) 
 




Notes:  The dependent variable is the call rate.  The output gap is 
measured as the residuals (forecast errors, after 1989:6) from a 
regression of industrial production on time and time squared for the 
period 1968:1-1989:6.  Estimates are by GMM with correction for MA(12) 
autocorrelation.  The optimal weighting matrix is obtained from first-
step 2SLS parameter estimates. 
2 c tests for overidentifying restrictions 
are easily passed (p > 0.95) in all specifications. 
1The instrument set includes a constant, plus lags 1-6, 9, and 12 of 
log-differenced commodity prices (IMF), log differenced CPI, log-
differenced output gap, the log-differenced real yen-dollar exchange 
rate, and the call rate.   
2The instrument set is the same as above plus lags 1-6 of the log-
differenced change in stock prices. 
3Sum of the coefficients on lags 0-5 inclusive of the log-differenced 
change in stock prices.  The reported standard error is for the sum of   65
the coefficients.  The p-value for the hypothesis that all six 
coefficients are equal to zero is 0.020 for the full sample, 0.000 for 




Figure 1.  Effects of an asset bubble when monetary policy responds only 
to expected inflation 
 
Notes:  The panels of the figure show simulated responses of selected 
variables to a positive innovation to the bubble process in period zero 
equal to 1% of the steady-state fundamental price.  The ex ante 
probability that the bubble will burst in any period is 0.5.  We assume 
a realization in which the bubble bursts in period 5.  The solid lines 
show responses under an aggressive monetary policy,  1 0 . 2 + = t t
n
t E r p .  The 
dashed lines show responses under an accommodative policy, 
1 01 . 1 + = t t
n
t E r p . 
 











































DASHED: accomodative  66
 
Figure 2.  Effects of an asset bubble when monetary policy responds to 
stock prices as well as to expected inflation 
 
Notes:  The panels of the figure show simulated responses of selected 
variables to a positive innovation to the bubble process, under the same 
assumptions as in Figure 1.  Monetary policy responds to the lagged log 
stock price as well as to expected inflation.   The solid lines show 
responses under an aggressive monetary policy,  1 1 1 . 0 0 . 2 - + + = t t t
n
t s E r p .  
The dashed lines show responses under an accommodative policy, 
1 1 1 . 0 01 . 1 - + + = t t t
n
t s E r p . 















































Figure 3.  Effects of an asset boom followed by an asset bust 
 
Notes:  Same exercise as in Figure 1, except that the positive bubble 
shock is followed by a symmetric negative bubble shock that lasts from 
periods 6 through 10.  Monetary policy responds only to expected 
inflation. 




















Figure 4.  The effects of leverage on responses to an asset-price boom 
and bust 
 
Notes:  Same exercise as Figure 3, comparison of high steady-state 
leverage (ratio of net worth to capital of 0.5, as in baseline 
simulations) and low steady-state leverage (net worth-capital ratio of 
0.75).  Monetary policy is assumed to target expected inflation 
aggressively. 
 





















Figure 5.  Responses to stock-price increases based on a mixture of 
fundamental and non-fundamental forces 
 
Notes:  The figure shows the simulated responses of selected variables 
to a permanent one percent increase in productivity followed by a five-
period positive bubble.  Monetary policy is aggressive in targeting 
inflation.  The solid line shows responses when policy responds to the 
lagged stock prices as well as expected inflation, the dashed line shows 
responses when policy responds to expected inflation only. 
 





SOLID: policy responds to asset price











Figure 6.  Effects of a rise in the external finance premium 
 
Notes: Shown are responses to an exogenous 50-basis point rise in the 
premium for external finance, with autoregressive coefficient 0.9.  
Monetary policy responds only to expected inflation.  The dashed lines 
show variable responses under accommodative monetary policy, the solid 
lines show responses under aggressive monetary policy. 
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Figure 7.  Actual and fitted values of the U.S. federal funds rate 
Notes:  The figure shows actual and fitted values of the U.S. federal 
funds rate, with fitted values derived from a model that accommodates 































































































































Figure 8.  Actual and target values of the U.S. federal funds rate 
Notes:  The figure shows actual and estimated target values of the U.S. 
federal funds rate.  Estimated target values make no allowance for the 
lagged adjustment of the interest rate. 
 








































































































Figure 9.  Actual and fitted values of the Japanese call money rate 
Notes:  Comparison of the actual and fitted values of the Japanese call 


































































































































Figure 10.  Actual and target values of the Japanese call money rate 
Notes:  Comparison of the actual and estimated target values of the 
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